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REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND." By
Charles E. Clark. Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1947. Pp. lv, 310. $6.00.
THIS second edition of Judge Clark's classic little book is designed to serve
the same purpose as the first: to bring clarification to that peculiarly obscure
body of doctrine and practice known as the law of "rights in the land of an-
other." The first edition was hailed, despite its brevity, as one of the few great
law books of our time;1 this new edition merits and is receiving similar ac-
claim.2 In the first edition the author, restricting himself largely to the prob-
lem of "the transferability of those non-possessory interests in land tradition-
ally known as incorporeal hereditaments," announced his aim as being "to state
clearly the conflicting views of policy" and "to set forth a more accurate histori-
cal perspective, particularly in the law of covenants running with the land where
it is believed that false notions of history have hampered the development of a
consistent modern doctrine."'8 In the present edition he elaborates his purpose
as, not "reform or rewriting," but "clear exposition," "exposition and clarifica-
tion through analysis of precedents."'4 This objective will not be scorned by
scholars and practitioners who are concerned to preserve the widest possible
scope for private agreement and to make private agreement a more effective
instrument of land planning and development in individual and community
interest.
In structure and thought the book remains much the same, though its sub-
stance is vastly enriched by a new chapter, three appendices, new critical com-
ments in the old text, and extensive new citations to cases, statutes, articles,
and books. The original chapters on licenses, the running of easements and
profits, the running of real covenants, party-wall agreements as real covenants,
the running of equitable restrictions, and the running of rents, are presented in
their original order, without important change, and the principal instruments of
clarification are still incisive use of Hohfeld's dichotomy between "operative
facts" and "resulting legal interests," a vigorous scalpel on "false notions of
history," and a Connecticut Yankee's wise intuition of relevant community
policy. The new chapter, on "Legislative Restriction of Running Interests,"
eloquently urges reform by way of statutory time limit on restrictions of all
1. The reviews are collected in Farnham, Book Review, 33 CoRN. L. Q. 153 n. 1
(1947).
2. Farnham, note 1 supra, and Tefft, Book Review, 15 U. Cur. L. REv. 490 (1948).
See also Book Reviews by Sims, 33 A.B.A. J. 1130 (1947); Jones, 61 HARV. L. Rrv. 376
(1948), Schuyler, 42 ILL. L. Rv. 833 (1948) ; Bailey, 64 L. Q. REv. 272 (1948) ; Carna-
han, 7 LAW. GumD Ray. 232 (1947); Rapacz, 32 MINx. L. REV. 94 (1947); Conard, 23
N.Y.U.L.Q. Ray. 371 (1948); Roberts, 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 301 (1947).
3. Preface (1st ed.), p. v.
4. P. 9.
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forms.5 The appendices contain the author's magnificent demolitions, previ-
ously published in this JournalO and the Cornwll Law Q)uartcrly," of some of the
ill-founded archaisms of the Restatement of Servitudes. With pardonable
pride, the author observes "all conclusions previously stated have been thought-
fully reconsidered; but, whether because of the author's obstinacy of belief or
because of their fundamental soundness, such a reconsideration afforded con-
viction that no changes of substance should be made in those conclusions." s
It is obvious, however, that the author's "conclusions" have not succeeded in
bringing clarification to this important domain of doctrinal strife. Apart from
unslaked bewilderment in judicial opinion and decision and the insistent de-
mand of reviewers of the new edition for still further clarification,10 the most
strildng and compelling evidence of continued confusion is that prime object of
the author's animus, The Restatement of Property, Division V, Servitudes.
Prepared after the appearance of judge Clark's first edition and published with
all the authority of the American Law Institute, this volume offers a compli-
cated body of black-letter doctrine which utterly ignores the Hohfeld distinc-
tion between "operative facts" and "legal consequences," rejects Judge Clark's
policy preference for reasonable restrictions as instruments of land planning,
and invents some new and "false notions of history" all its own. Thus, this
authoritative volume distinguishes between "possessory" and "non-possessory"
interests by the "presence or absence of the exclusive privilege of occupation"
and,1 ' similarly, distinguishes between easements and licenses by criteria in
which the purported distinguishing characteristics are the very questions in
issue. An easement as defined by the Restatement is an interest in land in the
possession of another which (a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited
use or enjoyment of the land, (b) entities him to protection as against third
parties, (c) is not a normal incident of the possession of any land possessed by
the owner of the interest, and (d) is capable of creation by conveyance. 2 - A
license is said, in supposed contrast, to denote an interest in land in the posses-
5. Note how the author's discussion and recommendations in this chapter cut across
all traditional categorizations.
6. 52 YuxL L.J. 699 (1943) ; 53 Y.A L.J. 327 (1944).
7. 30 Coma. L. Q. 378 (1945).
8. Preface (2d ed.), p. iii.
9. Some of the cases are collected in McDouGcA AND Hnm, Pr.op.- rV WrALTr,
LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING, AND DEVF.LOPMMNT C. IX (1943). For excellent example,
see Frye v. Sibbett, 145 Neb. 600, 17 N.W. 2d 617 (1945), noted, 13 U. CHL L Rnv. 202
(1945).
10. See note 2 supra. Note especially Jones and Tefft who renew Chafee's earlier de-
mand for a clarifying statute. Chafee, Book Review, 43 HAv. L. Rv. 334 (1929). It is
sometimes forgotten that legislation cannot bring rationality to practice in the abence of
a real clarification of community interests, the de-mystification of technical ambiguities,
and the establishment of agencies of administration competent to give effect to clarified
policies.
11. RFSTATEmENr, ProPxaRY 2S97 (1944).
12. Id. at § 450.
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sion of another which (a) entitles the owner of the interest to a use of the
land, (b) arises from consent, (c) is not incident to an estate in the land, and
(d) is not an easement.' 3 When the issue before a court is whether a party has
the privilege of exclusive occupation, or whether an interest entitles the owner
to protection against third parties, or whether an interest is subject to the will
of the possessor of the land, these criteria are not likely to be very helpful; on
other issues, the probabilities that courts might reach such and such results on
these issues may or may not be relevant. The Restatement's strong hostility to
private agreement as an instrument of land planning appears at its boldest in
some of the sections in Part III, "Promises Respecting the Use of Land."
Here are stated, as Judge Clark tellingly documents, inhibitory requirements
of "privity of estate" and "touch and concern" such as were never before seen
in book or opinion.14 These requirements become somewhat farcical, however,
when in subsequent sections there are stated doctrines for "equitable obliga-
tion" which explicitly reject both antiquated mysticisms." It can safely be
ventured that Judge Clark, with all his strong language, has only begun to probe
the vulnerabilities and clarify the obscurities of the Restatement of Servitudes.
With all deference to a great educator become one of our greatest judges, it
may be suggested that Judge Clark himself does not always escape the bogs of
semantic confusion. Though in many instances he explicitly recognizes that
"easements," "licenses," "profits," "covenants running with the land," "equit-
able servitudes," and so on, are largely functional equivalents in comparable
contexts, 6 the basic organization of his book is still, as indicated above, in
terms of these traditional technical distinctions. In defining "license" he in-
sists upon a clear distinction between "physical operative facts" and "resulting
legal interests" and states a preference for a definition in terms of "operative
facts," but overlooks that it is courts who make facts "operative" and offers a
five-fold classification of licenses ("mere license," "always 'revocable' ";
privilege plus a power of extinguishing a legal interest; privilege accessory to
exercise a power, etc.) which is in considerable measure in terms of legal con-
sequences.' 7 He apologizes for the distinction between easement, "considered
as if attached to the land itself so as to pass with it," and real covenant, "passes
only to successors to the estate," as one "in theory,""' but does not pursue his
insight. He makes "possession" (fact or legal consequence?) the test of a "pos-
sessory interest" and in denying the creation of such an interest in certain in-
stances he suggests that "historically it would seem clear that the seisin of the
servient estate would n6t pass in such situation" and explains that "this appears
13. Id. at §512.
14. Id. at §§ 534, 537.
15. Id. at § 539 et seq. We do not ignore an attempted distinction between liability as
"promisor" and liability in equity. The confusion in this distinction is particularly trans-
parent in Rundell, Judge Clark on the American Law Instlitute's Law of Real Covenants:
A Comment, 53 YALE L. J. 312 (1944).
16. Pp. 24, 36, 173, 176.
17. Pp. 15, 25.
18. Pp. 65, 93.
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to be as satisfactory an answer as is possible, since the line must be drawn
somewhere."'19 Though he inveighs admirably and mightily against "privity of
estate," apparently he would preserve that other barnacle, "touch and concern."
He approves a verbalism taken from Dean Bigelow as "a scientific method of
approach to the problem which seems to afford the most practical working
tests." The method is described as "a measuring of the legal relations of the
parties with and without the covenant: If the promisor's legal relations in re-
spect to the land in question are lessened-his legal interest as owner rendered
less valuable by the promise-the burden of the covenant touches or concerns
that land; if the promisee's legal relations in respect to that land are increased
-his legal interest as owner rendered more valuable by the promise--the bene-
fit of the covenant touches or concerns that land."' ) It should be reasonably
obvious that this test is completely circular: if the court holds a covenant en-
forceable, the promisor's legal relations are lessened, his interest as owner ren-
dered less valuable, and the promisee's legal relations are increased, his interests
as owner rendered more valuable; aliter, if the contrary decision. Certainly
there is nothing in the formula which offers any intelligible policy for draw-
ing a line between agreements which should and should not run. Though, for a
final example, he recognizes that "there will be numerous cases where the doc-
trines of covenants and restrictions overlap, and where the plaintiff should have
a remedy under either doctrine,"2' 1 he does not equate "legal" and "equitable"
interests in the comprehensive way that our procedural and recording reforms,
and any rational policy, demand.
All this continued confusion suggests that such instruments as the Hohfeld
dichotomy, a few pungent lessons in legal history, and a simple contraposing
of polar policies of "unincumbered titles" and "permanence of development of
land," as useful and as advanced over previous insights as they are, are not
alone adequate to bring clarity and rationality into the obscurities and vagaries
of "rights in the land of another." A more comprehensive theory and some-
thing more than theory, to wit, new institutions of administration, may be re-
quired. Elsewhere the reviewer, with others, has suggested the vague outlines
of such a theory and measures.2 2 This theory begins with the recognition that
the traditional technicalities, "possessory interest," "easement," "license,"
"profit," "covenant running with the land," "equitable servitude," and so on,
make a completely confused reference to facts, to official responses to facts,
and to relevant policies, and that operational meaning can be given to such tech-
nicalities only by locating them in context. This context includes community
officials responding to a great variety of controvcrsies, where the identifications
19. Pp. 90, 91.
20. P.97.
21. Pp. 131, 181.
22. McDOUGAL AL-D HABEr, oP. cit. s:apra note 9, c. IX. The inadequacies of Hohfeld's
dichotomy are indicated on p. 28.
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and demands of the parties are quite different ("cases between the immediate
parties when the issue was whether an enforceable agreement ever had been
made, cases where it was assumed that an enforceable agreement had once been
made between the original parties but raising questions of what protection
should be given to this agreement against third parties, cases involving the as-
signability of the benefits of an agreement, cases requiring a determination of
the rights and duties of the parties with respect to matters which they did not
anticipate in their agreement, cases involving the termination of a once en-
forceable agreement, and cases concerning the subjection of private agree-
ments to specific claims or general regulation by the community"), about agree-
inents purporting to segmentize in infinite ways the continuum of possible uses
of land that the community will protect, on facts involving very different kinds
of uses (habitation, productive, servicing, governmental) and hence very dif-
ferent objectives of the parties, or different forms of "land" (surface, air,
light, water, minerals, oil, sub-surface, etc.), or different durations (tempor-
ary, specified period, indefinite, permanent), or different numbers of iisers
(public generally, specified private parties) or different forms of evidence of
the agreement (non-verbal behavior, oral permission, action in reliance, un-
sealed writing, sealed writing, language of promise, language of grant), and
using the traditional technicalities now as semantic equivalents, and again as
opposites, to effect various distributions of individual and community values.
An exposition which seeks to clarify the objectives of community intervention
in this process, making wise choice between, and giving concrete detail to,
such high level prescriptions as "unincumbered alienability" or "reasonable
permanency in land planning and development," must make at least the mini-
mal discriminations indicated above and identify such other variables, in differ-
ent specific institutional contexts, as may be significant for determining what
wise community policy may be in such contexts. Once policies are so clarified,
an observer-making the same discriminations-may study in detail trends in
official response, appraising their compatibility with such clarified policies, and
noting with a new precision any differences in response that vary with different
technical and policy arguments or with other environmental and predisposi-
tional factors. With the trends and conditions of official decision, and in-
compatibilities with community policies, so ascertained, it may become relevant
to consider, not doctrinal purification alone, but a whole range of alternatives
as rational means to a more effective securing of individual and community
interest. It could be found that what private agreement needs most to make
it efficient is an effective framework of public controls (to set basic design and
minimum standards and to prevent irrational movement away from basic de-
sign), and that the task of clarifying and implementing community objectives
is not one which can be performed once and for all, by rigid doctrinal pre-
scriptions such as arbitrary time limits, but requires rather flexible doctrine
and a continuous, expert supervision of constantly changing variables. The
most effective reform of "rights in the land of another" might be the adminis-
[Vol.,58
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tration in the first instance of private agreement, from creation to termination,
by the same public officials who are charged with the duty of effecting a ra-
tional general plan by public controls. It is unlikely that Judge Clark would
disagree with these proposals.2 It is to be hoped that in his third edition he
may bring his surpassing acuity and powerful rhetoric to their militant ad-
vocacy.
Mx.Nns S. McDoUGUj-
THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VAzirri. By G. Louis Joughin and Edmund M.
Morgan. New York. Harcourt Brace & Company, 1948. Pp. xvii, 598. ,$6.00.
MoRE than twenty years have passed since Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo
Vanzetti, convicted of murder in connection with a payroll holdup twelve miles
south of Boston, were put to death by the Commonwealth. A generation new
to the facts and concerned with the administration of justice from a moral
and social point of view is now presented with a highly readable and scholarly
study and evaluation of a case which still has profound reverberations and
significance on current issues.
In an unusual type of collaboration, Professor Joughin of the New School
for Social Research, a scholar in the field of literature, and Professor Morgan
of the Harvard Law School, bring historical perspective to bear on the case.
They examine respectively the social and literary impacts and the legal aspects
of the case. Conclusions arrived at and formulated separately about the law,
society and literature receive integrated consideration in a concluding chapter
and are presented, with cautious avoidance of overstatement, as "the begin-
nings of historical judgment."
In dealing with the legal features of the case, Professor Morgan analyzes
in some detail the records of the Plymouth and Dedham trials, the numerous
motions for a new trial, the two hearings before the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, the petition for executive clemency and the hearings and
decisions of the Advisory Committee which was headed by President A.
Lawrence Lowell of Harvard. His conclusion is that Sacco and Vanzetti
"had a trial according to all the forms of law, but it was not a fair trial"; they
were "the victims of a tragic miscarriage of Justice."'
The failure of the legal system in the case is ascribed by Professor Morgan
to a tragic combination of an incompetently handled defense, a biased and
prejudiced judge, and "an astute and able prosecutor whose ideals and practice
did not require him either to present before the court or to disclose to counsel
for the defense competent and testimonially qualified witnesses whose evidence
would help the accused and damage the claims of the state-a prosecutor who
23. Note his comments on "Possibilities of Reform in the Law," pp. 9-12.
t William K. Towmsend Professor of La,, Yale Law School.
1. P. 157.
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did not hesitate to use against the defendants material likely to inflame the
prevailing prejudices against men of their opinions, even though its legitimate
bearing upon any issue in the case was so slight as to be negligible."'
The legacy of the Sacco-Vanzetti case to the law, Professor Morgan be-
lieves, is the defects revealed in our system of administering criminal justice.
He points out that our adversary system of litigation in criminal trials does
not afford equal opportunity to prosecution and defense, that the use made of
expert testimony is scandalous rather than wise and that a defendant who is
the object of community hostility-a Negro in the South for example-is
hardly assured of a fair trial by an impartial tribunal.3 Professor Morgan
advocates adoption of the following safeguards "by statute, rule or judicial
decision": (1) required disclosure by the prosecution to the defense of the
existence of witnesses with relevant knowledge favorable to the defendants,
and discretion in the trial judge also to require the prosecution to disclose to
the defense relevant information and documentary evidence in its possession;
(2) power in the trial judge, especially in criminal cases, to select impartial,
competent experts responsible solely to the court, with the parties still per-
mitted to call other experts whose testimony would, however, be subject to
discount because of partisanship; and (3) granting to an accused the privilege
of being tried by a judge or body of judges in cases where local feeling and
prejudice make it difficult to secure an unbiased jury.
In his discussion of the adversary system of litigation in criminal trials,
there is one point deserving of study which Professor Morgan fails to mention.
So long as crime is news, the prosecutor's office will remain a choice stepping-
stone for political advancement. And so long as basic constitutional and pro-
cedural safeguards remain matters on which the American public is compara-
tively uninformed and insensitive, political premium will continue to be paid
to the convicting prosecutor rather than to the one with a sense of fairness or
higher duty.
In the social history, Professor Joughin has collated and set forth a rich
storehouse of material illustrating and documenting the reaction to and upon
the case of various groups and representative individuals-the foreign-born,
labor, political parties of the left, intellectuals, the church, the bar, the press
and the international and diplomatic world.
The Sacco-Vanzetti case gave rise to sharp, social cleavage and conflict.
On the one hand were those who felt that injustice was being done. On the
other hand were those who felt that the state's authority and the integrity of
Massachusetts institutions were challenged and that this issue transcended in
importance the issue of innocence or guilt. The line was drawn not in ac-
cordance with the orthodox Marxian concept of the class struggle but rather,
2. P. 157.
3. On the related problem of the impact of community prejudices on law enforcement,
particularly in civil rights cases, see To SEcURE THESE RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S ComMTTEE ON Crm RIGHTS, 124 (1947).
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translated into today's semantics, between "the forces of democratic and un-
democratic action". 4 Sacco and Vanzetti, as anarchists, held the concept that
the minimum of governmental regulation of private life yields the ma-ximum
of individual human happiness. Whatever else may be said about it, this
credo is the direct opposite of a totalitarian, state-ist political philosophy. As
between the "radical" ideas of the two men and the authoritarian caste which
anti-Sacco-Vanzetti thinking assumed, the former would today have to be
regarded as more nearly consistent with the "democratic" ideal.
There emerges from the social history of the case a myriad of issues and
problems which continue to beset us today. Among these were the failure
of the press to give the public enough of the facts or any comprehension of
the real issues; as well as the inability of critics to state views to which their
employers objected (e.g., the refusal of the Ncew York Times to print articles
it engaged H. G. Wells to write and the similar experience of Heyvood Broun
leading to his discharge by Ralph Pulitzer from the old Ncw York World).
An especially timely issue is touched upon in Professor Joughin's pre-1948
election assertion that, although a meticulous qualitative analysis may be pos-
sible, quantitatively "[p]ublic opinion cannot be characterized with any high
degree of statistical accuracy."' ;
Much of the factual material detailed by Professor Joughin in this section
of the book is of high incidental interest-including the Wigmore-Frank-
furter battle of titans and the relationship to the case of numerous prominent
persons, among them many well-known figures of bench and bar. The legal
profession was divided on the case. Many of its scholars and teachers be-
lieved that injustice was being done. "On the other hand," Professor Joughin
observes, "the practicing students of those teachers, a group several hundred
times as large, were strongly of the opposite opinion. The causes of this
separation are not pleasant to contemplate; . . . they relate to the whole
problem of the position of the legal profession in society. . . ."0 VWrhile only
a small minority of the practicing bar saw fit to protest, it may be noted that
included in that group, as might be expected, were some of the most eminent,
courageous and articulate lawyers.
The literature which emerged from the Sacco-Vanzetti case is evaluated
by Professor Joughin from two aspects: its value as social criticism and its
intrinsic literary worth. The Sacco-Vanzetti literature thus reviewed and ap-
praised includes 144 poems, 6 plays and 8 novels-the work of such figures
as WVitter Bynner, Countee Cullen, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Maxwell Ander-
son, S. N. Behrman, James Thurber and Elliot Nugent, Upton Sinclair, H. G.
Wells, Bernard DeVoto, John Dos Passos, Ruth 'McKenny and James T.
Farrell. The chief literary use of the case was in the novels and Professor
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Dos Passos and in Sinclair's Boston. In the latter, Professor Joughin be-
lieves there is "a fidelity to the factual records . . . seldom met with in
historical novels .... -7 In both books, he finds "a type of direct moral judg-
ment not ordinarily associated with writers of the left" suggesting "the exist-
ence of a pattern in American fiction which has been unduly neglected" and
which warrants further study.
In two poignant and penetrating chapters entitled "The Murders" and "The
Mind and Thought of Vanzetti," Professor Joughin reviews and appraises the
private character and personal quality of the two men. The manner in which
Sacco and Vanzetti lived through the seven years of public notice which
intervened between their arrest and their execution, their words, their conduct
and the way they met death are themselves a saga. Here is a great history of
human courage and dignity and, in the case of Vanzetti, an immigrant fish
peddler, of the development, through self-education, under hardship, of a
gifted, superior, philosophic mind of disciplined, scientific quality.
In 1947, a group of distinguished citizens offered to the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts for erection on Boston Common a bas-relief plaque of Sacco-
Vanzetti by Gutzom Borglum. The plaque was rejected by the Governor on
the ground that public opinion in the state was still divided.
LEo ROSENt
GOVERNMENT As EMPLOYER. By Sterling D. Spero. New York: Remsen
Press, 1948. Pp. 497. $5.65.
PEOPLE who love liberty should read Government As Employcr. Sterling
Spero has made a tremendous contribution to a difficult field, that of the basic
conflict between authority and liberty in a democratic society. In the past,
the subject of government as employer has been approached from the com-
pletely negative point of view of rights employees do not enjoy. Dr. Spero,
however, bases his discussion upon an antithetical postulate. He points out
that organization by public employees to bring pressure on the government-
employer does not necessarily "represent a derogation of sovereignty and an
attack on the authority of the state."' And, although the book is neither pro-
government nor pro-union, one gets the impression that in the interest of
liberty "it is a primary obligation of those in authority in a free society to
guard the rights of citizens including the freedom of association of those em-
ployed by the government." Certain factors naturally limit the exercise of
absolute authority by any free government over its employees. Dr. Spero
names these factors. It will be helpful to public administration if officials
learn what they are and consider them.
7. P. 454.
8. P. 454.




Government officials delight in saying that collective bargaining in the public
service is impossible; yet it has worked in actual practice. Experience in the
Tennessee Valley Authority, the Inland Waterways Corporation, and certain
other government agencies indicates that the greatest efficiency actually re-
sults when administrative discretion in the field of labor relations is exercised
democratically through negotiation with the employees. "If half the energy
spent in trying to prove that states, municipalities or federal agencies cannot
bargain collectively with their employees were devoted to finding ways to meet
the understandable desire of the employees to exercise as large and direct a
role as possible in the fixing of their working conditions, sound administration
would be more effectively advanced."'
In the central chapters, Govcrnmcnt as Employcr presents much helpful,
factual information. The historical material on the fight for the shorter work-
day and on the postal organizations shows extensive research. Probably some
of the information will have value only to practitioners in the field and students
of the labor movement, but it would be difficult to understand the present prob-
lems of government employees without it.
Of special significance and value is the treatment of police unionism and the
Boston Police Strike of 1919. That experience has done more to confuse
general thinking about the government as employer than any other. Certainly
it has been referred to more than any other, and it is obvious from many of
the references made that it is quite thoroughly misunderstood. Dr. Spero
gives a clear, thorough, well-documented description of the entire affair."
He lets the facts speak for themselves. No effort is made to fix responsibility,
although the record demonstrates that it rests squarely with the then Police
Commissioner and the then Governor of 'Massachusetts. It is a story of cold,
calculating, callous reaction which should be required reading for anyone who
says, "But don't you remember the Boston Police Strike?" when public em-
ployee unionism is discussed. According to Dr. Spero: "The indications are
that Commissioner Curtis, in order to break the strike, turn public opinion
against the policemen, and destroy the union, deliberately misled the mayor
and left the city unprotected." Lawlessness and vandalism were invited by
the highest authorities. That carefully planned anti-labor campaign, includ-
ing violation of high public trust, was a large factor in making Governor Cal-
vin Coolidge president of the United States and in placing in a bad light the
efforts of public employees to exercise the rights of assembly and petition.
The ghosts which bedevil many public officials and particularly public law
officers in no way annoy or confuse Dr. Spero. This is evident from his
treatment of political activit3. The doctrine of the political neutrality of the
civil service, he says, was brought here by admirers of the undeniable merits
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restrictions on political activity like those found in the United States. In the
British civil service this problem is left largely to the individual departments.
This agrees with the contention that housekeeping in government should be
a continuing process and that it is doubly valuable if undertaken by states and
local units of government rather than being forced on them by the long arm of
the central government in Washington.
However, the Hatch Act (which the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees has consistently opposed) has been of some benefit.
Public employees in doing their day by day work should be free from "politi-
cian interferences." And administrators should be safe from political pressure
in doing their administrative work, including the exercise of disciplinary au-
thority over subordinates. Such matters should be decided on the basis of the
merits of each case and not on the basis of political expediency or pressure.
But the Act, "in seeking to neutralize completely the political influence of the
members of the service goes far beyond what is necessary to achieve its uni-
versally approved objective of preventing the political exploitation of the
staff. At the same time, it does not reach the most serious political abuses
still prevailing in the service. Solution of the problem would require a far
more thorough program of reform than the policy makers seem to desire."
Among the forces which have seen this most clearly are the organizations of
civil service employees which have an institutional interest in combatting the
evils of outside political interference. It should be possible to change the law
so that it does not take away precious and necessary rights and privileges and
at the same time retain its benefits.
We need administrators of employing governments who believe in de-
mocracy and who will not resist democratizing public administration, which
is a major aim of public employees. Change in the basic structure of govern-
ment certainly is not sought, but the growth of organization demonstrates in-
terest in freedom and a desire to play a larger part in making the determina
tions which directly affect them. A legalistic approach on the part of public
officials will not solve the problems which arise as government employment
grows. It would be difficult to state the case better than is done by Dr. Spero
in his closing paragraph:
"The public services are expanding and the number of workers in the em-
ploy of the government is constantly increasing. The American public service,
quite as much as the service of any other country, needs such criticism of its
management and such a check upon its authority as only independent employee
organizations, supported by a free labor movement, can give. Yet it still re-
mains the duty of government to see to it that the public services operate for
the benefit of the whole public. It is out of the inevitable conflicts inherent in
this situation that problems of employer-employee relations arise in the govern-
ment service. Fundamentally these problems are a phase of the perennial con-
flict between authority and liberty in a free society. The issue admits of no
final solution but only of working arrangements which leave intact the basic
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claims of each party. If government presses its sovereign authority to its
logical end, it may destroy freedom. If the employees of government fully
exercise their collective pressure in their own behalf, they may undermine
the public security upon which freedom rests. The life of a free society de-
pends upon the maintenance of freedom and authority in delicate balance. The
preservation of this balance depends in turn upon mutual restraint on the
part of both government and its employees founded upon the recognition of




UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED, TiTLE 15, SEcs. 81-1113. Minneapolis:
The West Publishing Co., 1948.
A truly "unusual feature . . . is the practical and scholarly article in this
volume, by Daphney Robert on the Lanham Act, which revised the trade-mark
laws effective July 5, 1937." The author, whose name is correctly spelled
"Daphne Robert" at the beginning of her twenty-three page "Commentary"
is described as "a recognized national authority on trade-marks."2 So she is;
and her authority as the author of a provocative monograph on the new Act is
strengthened by her position as trade-mark counsel to the Coca Cola Company.
Is the U. S. Code Annotated any place for the expression of controversial
opinion on the probable construction of new legislation? True, every school-
boy knows that it is not an official publication; but its usually neutral content
makes all the more disconcerting the possibility of ambiguous citation to what
may be mistaken for canonical pronouncements.
As examples of the views which Miss Robert is certainly entitled to hold,
but which may or may not receive judicial concurrence, the following state-
ments may be cited:
1. With respect to the power of the Federal Trade Commission to petition
for cancellation of a mark on the general statutory grounds, "It is assumed
that [such petitions] must show on their face that the public interest is ad-
versely affected." Also, according to Miss Robert, "it is generally believed
that it was included as an auxiliary proceeding after the use of a mark has
been made the subject of a cease and desist order under the Federal Trade
Commission Act." 3
5. Pp. 486-7.
' International President, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
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2. With respect to the antitrust violation proviso, Miss Robert takes the
position that it affects only a claim to incontestability.4
3. She continues in this Commentary her advocacy of the view that the Act
draws from the international conventions to which the United States is a
party a "Federal code of unfair competition" which nullifies the applicability
of Erie v. Tompkins in this field.5
Discussing the deletion from the new Act of the goods of the "same de-
scriptive properties" classification, she asserts that now "The goods or services
need not be identical or even renwtely related." (emphasis supplied)."
Miss Robert's Commentary is in general an able summary of the Act and a
clear exposition of her views. It would be an appropriate law review article.
The publishers of statutory compilations, however, should stick to their head-
notes, and direct elsewhere any urge they have to edit a law review.
RALPH S. BROWNt
BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. By William Zwanzig. Indianapolis:
The Allen Smith Company, 1948. Pp. x, 750. $15.00.
MR. ZWANZiG, a former referee in bankruptcy who probably encountered
during his term of office many a "legal practitioner unfamiliar with bank-
ruptcy procedure," has compiled for such practitioners a handbook designed to
"result in a prompt and accurate disposition of the estate with the least'
amount of effort in reading statutes and decisions." Part I, entitled "Bank-
ruptcy Practice and Procedure" and'comprising roughly one-half of the book,
presupposes virtually no effort on the part of the practitioner, whether he be
representing the bankrupt, the creditors, the receiver or the trustee, and
whether the proceedings be straight bankruptcy, Section 75, Chapter X, Chap-
ter XI, Chapter XII or Chapter XIII.
In each instance, Mr. Zwanzig takes him firmly by the hand and conducts
him through the procedural steps, supplying him at appropriate places with
forms in necessary number and with occasional reminders that "an additional
copy would be found convenient for counsel's office files." No attempt is
made to improve upon the Official Forms as far as they go, but all omissions
in the official compilation are supplied-even including routine orders ap-
proving bonds of the receiver and trustee. It seems likely that Part I will be
more frequently consulted by legal stenographers than by effortless practi-
tioners. Part II consists of a reproduction of the Bankruptcy Act, sparingly
annotated, apparently still with a view to relieving the practitioner of the effort
of reading cases, together with the General Orders and Official Forms (again),
Part III is a three-way index to the Act and Orders, the forms, and the au-
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